Realization Utility with Reference-Dependent Preferences by Ingersoll Jr., Jonathan E. & Jin, Lawrence J.
 
 
 
	
 
 
 
 
 
Realization Utility 
 
with Reference-Dependent Preferences† 
 
 
 
 
Jonathan E. Ingersoll, Jr. 
 
Yale School of Management 
 
 
Lawrence J. Jin 
 
Yale School of Management 
 
 
PO Box 208200 
New Haven CT 
06520-8200 
 
203-432-5924 
 
Jonathan.Ingersoll@Yale.edu 
Jin@Alumni.Caltech.edu 
 
 
  
September 18, 2012 
 
Forthcoming, The Review of Financial Studies 
 
†We thank our colleagues at the Yale School of Management and the seminar participants at the 
LBS Trans-Atlantic Doctoral Conference, the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, and the 
2012 Western Finance Association Annual Meeting for helpful discussions. In particular we 
would like to thank Nick Barberis, David Hirshleifer, and an anonymous referee. Jin 
acknowledges support from a Whitebox Advisors grant. 
 
 
Realization Utility with Reference-Dependent Preferences 
 
Jonathan E. Ingersoll, Jr. and Lawrence J. Jin 
 
Yale School of Management 
 
 
We develop a tractable model of realization utility that studies the role of reference-dependent S-
shaped preferences in a dynamic investment setting with reinvestment. Our model generates both 
voluntarily realized gains and losses. It makes specific predictions about the volume of gains and 
losses, the holding periods, and the sizes of both realized and paper gains and losses that can be 
calibrated to a variety of statistics, including Odean’s measure of the disposition effect. Our 
model also predicts several anomalies including, among others, the flattening of the capital 
market line and a negative price for idiosyncratic risk. 
 
 
JEL classification: G02, G11, G12 
Keywords: Realization Utility, Prospect Theory, Disposition Effect
1 
 
Realization Utility with Reference-Dependent Preferences 
 
Jonathan E. Ingersoll, Jr. and Lawrence J. Jin 
 
How do investors decide about and evaluate their own investment performance? Standard 
economic theory posits that investors maximize the expected utility of their lifetime consumption 
stream by dynamically adjusting their portfolio allocations based on their current wealth and 
their expectations of the future. Although this way of modeling investors’ behavior may be close 
to reality for sophisticated investors, it is questionable whether less sophisticated investors 
behave this way.  
A growing amount of research shows that individual investors do not always behave in 
the ways that expected utility theory predicts. In particular, the independence axiom seems 
troublesome as does the assumption of risk aversion, at least for losses. The latter assumption is 
not a requirement of expected utility theory, but it or something like it is important for most 
equilibrium models which follow from maximizing behavior. In contrast to what theories like the 
APT or CAPM predict, individual investors seem to be particularly concerned about an asset’s 
change in price from a reference point. 
Behavioral literature suggests alternative views of modeling investors’ behavior. Kah-
neman and Tversky (1979) have argued that risk aversion does not characterize many choices 
and proposed an S-shaped utility function. Shefrin and Statman (1985) use “mental accounting” 
to justify investors’ concentrating on specific separate incidents. Thaler (1999) says “A realized 
loss is more painful than a paper loss.” Barberis and Xiong (2012) study a model which assumes 
that investors think of their investing experience as a series of separate episodes during each of 
which they either made or lost money and that the primary source of utility comes in a burst 
when a gain or loss is realized.1 Frydman et al. (2012) find evidence using the neural data that 
supports this “realization utility” hypothesis.  
In this paper, we use these notions to develop an intertemporal model of investors who 
have prospect theory’s S-shaped utility and who evaluate their performance incident by incident 
based on realized profits and losses.2 Our model is a partial equilibrium framework with an 
infinite horizon. An investor purchases stocks whose prices evolve as geometric Brownian 
motions. At each subsequent point in time, the investor decides whether to hold onto his current 
investment or realize his gain or loss thereby obtaining an immediate utility burst. If he sells, he 
reinvests the proceeds after transaction costs into another stock. We show that the investor’s 
optimal strategy is to wait until the stock price rises or falls to certain percentages above or 
below the purchase price before selling. Our model includes that of Barberis and Xiong (2012) as 
a special case.  
Voluntary loss taking can be optimal in a dynamic setting because the subsequent 
                                                 
1 Further discussion on the psychological foundation of viewing investments as episodes is in their paper. 
2 Kyle, Ou-Yang, and Xiong (2006) and Henderson (2012) study one-time liquidation problems with prospect theory 
preferences. But reinvestment, which is a key component of our model, is ignored in their models. 
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reinvestment resets the reference level and increases the likelihood of realizing future gains. But 
in the Barberis Xiong (2012) model, utility is piecewise linear. As a direct consequence, they 
predict that investors voluntarily realize gains but never voluntarily sell at a loss, which is clearly 
unrealistic and inconsistent with the data. In our model, with an S-shaped function, marginal 
utility decreases with the magnitude of both gains and losses. This means that lifetime utility can 
be increased by taking frequent small gains along with occasional larger losses because the latter 
have less total disutility than the utility of the former, and realizing losses resets the reference 
level for future gains. The disposition effect, an empirically robust pattern that individual 
investors have higher propensities to realize gains than to realize losses,3 follows naturally from 
this result but it is a dynamic result. 
What has been commonly argued in both theoretical and empirical literatures is that an S-
shaped utility function leads to the disposition effect because risk seeking over losses induces 
investors to retain their positions and gamble on the future while risk aversion over gains induces 
the opposite. However, this is a static argument. Extrapolating this reasoning period by period 
would imply losses are never realized; the disposition effect should be infinite. In our dynamic 
realization utility model exactly the opposite is true. Investors naturally want gains, but an S-
shaped utility helps to generate voluntary losses and thereby reduces the magnitude of the 
disposition effect to the observed level. 
We calibrate our model in two parts. First we show that the magnitudes and frequencies 
of realized gains and losses and the frequencies of paper gains and losses as observed in the 
trading data of Odean and others are consistent with the type of simple two-point strategy our 
model predicts. In particular, Odean reports that 54% of round-trip trades are realized gains with 
an average size of 28%; the remainder are losses averaging 23%. Also conditional on a trade, 
investors realize 15% of possible gains and only 10% of possible losses. Using those average 
realized gain and loss sizes, our model makes the very accurate prediction that 58% of sales 
should be gains, and investors should have propensities of 14% and 11% to realize gains and 
losses, respectively. In addition, we propose a modified form of Tversky-Kahneman utility that 
generates the two optimal sales points, 28% and 23%, either alone or in a mixture of 
heterogeneous investors. 
Our model also has a variety of other empirical implications and predictions. For 
instance, investors may be risk-seeking in some circumstances due to the option value inherent in 
realizing losses; this helps explain a flatter security market line and the negative pricing of 
idiosyncratic risk as shown in Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang (2006).  It may also help explain 
why investors appear to hold portfolios that appear under-diversified. 
The plan of our paper is as follows. In Section 1, we lay out a specific intertemporal 
reference-dependent realization utility model and present its solution and basic insights. Section 
                                                 
3 The disposition effect for individual investors has been found in the U.S., Israel, Finland, China, and Sweden, by 
Odean (1998), Shapira and Venezia (2001), Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001), Feng and Seasholes (2005), and Calvet, 
Campbell, and Sodini (2009), respectively. It is also documented for U.S. mutual fund managers, the real estate 
market, and the exercise of executive stock options, by Frazzini (2006), Genesove and Mayer (2001), and Heath, 
Huddart, and Lang (1999). 
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2 examines the properties of the derived value function and analyzes the optimal sales policies. 
Section 3 provides a detailed calibration of our model to several empirical regularities. Section 4 
analyzes voluntary loss realization in a more general context. Section 5 presents further model 
applications and predictions. Section 6 gives some concluding remarks and direction for future 
research. A summary of the important notation, all the proofs, and some more detailed technical 
considerations are included in the Appendix. 
1.  A Realization Utility Model with Tversky-Kahneman Utility 
 In this section we present a simple, specific model of intertemporal realization utility. 
Our investor takes positions in a series of purchases, buying a number of shares and later selling 
his entire position and reinvesting it.4 Each realized gain or loss contributes a burst of utility, and 
our investor acts to maximize the expectation of the sum of the discounted values of these bursts.   
We assume the investor applies narrow framing when he evaluates his gains. This 
assumption side-steps any complications that might arise from diversification or rebalancing 
motives.5 Narrow framing can be justified if the investor derives realization utility only when 
both the purchase and sale prices of the asset are salient, and, therefore, evaluating individual 
assets is the applicable setting for studying realization utility. As a result, even when the investor 
holds multiple stock positions simultaneously, narrow framing allows us to study each sequence 
of purchases and sales separately.   
Secondly, we assume that a utility burst is received only at the time when a gain or a loss 
is realized. As with prospect theory, we normalize utility so that gains and losses contribute 
positive and negative utility, respectively.6 While it is assumed that utility depends primarily on 
the size, G of the gain or loss, it seems reasonable that the reference level, R, might also have a 
separate effect. In particular, a gain or loss of a given size probably has a greater utility impact, 
either good or bad, the smaller is the reference level; e.g., the gain or loss of $10 is felt more 
strongly when the reference level is $100 than when it is $500. Therefore, we denote the utility 
burst function as a function of both variables, U(G, R). In this paper we assume that U(G, R) is 
homogeneous of degree  in G and R  
 ( , ) )( / .U G R R u G R  (1) 
                                                 
4 Our model restriction of full liquidation is an empirically plausible one for individual investors. Feng and Sea-
sholes (2005) document that individual investors trading through a large Chinese brokerage house during 1999–
2000 liquidated their full position 80.35% of the time when selling. Shapira and Venezia (2001) report that approxi-
mately 80% of round trips on the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange in 1994 consisted of a single purchase followed by a 
single sale of the entire holding. Kaustia (2010) reports a similar result for his Finnish data though he does not 
provide specific numbers. 
5 For instance, the investor might have an incentive to sell a losing stock to purchase a winning stock. Another 
example could be the incentive of purchasing a diversified fund. These considerations are outside the scope of this 
paper though some related discussion is provided in the last two sections of the paper. 
6 Typically the centering of utility is arbitrary and has no effect on expected utility maximization. In some models 
like this, the investor might be able to choose to take no action at all so if no action is presumed to give a utility of 
zero, then the centering chosen here can affect participation in the market. 
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This assumption is important for keeping the model tractable, but it also focuses utility on rates 
of return rather than dollar changes which is in keeping with the general emphasis in Finance. 
Expressed in this way, the scaling parameter  gauges the impact of the reference level on utility 
bursts measured as rates of return. 
We study a Merton-type partial equilibrium economy in continuous time with an infinite 
horizon. At t  0, the investor chooses either to stay out of the market which earns him a utility 
of zero or to invest in one of a number of identically distributed stocks. The stock price evolves 
according to a geometric Brownian motion, / ,d ddS S t    where µ and  are the growth rate 
and logarithmic standard deviation, respectively, and  is a standard Brownian motion. At each 
subsequent point in time, t, the investor chooses either to hold his investment for a longer time or 
to sell his entire position and realize a utility burst. When he sells, he pays a proportional trans-
action cost, ks, and reinvests the net proceeds after paying a second proportional transaction cost, 
kp reducing his investment to (1 ) /(1 ) .s pt t tX k X k KX      Between realization dates, the 
investment value follows the same geometric Brownian motion as the underlying asset 
 / .d ddX X t     (2) 
 In a static prospect theory setting, the reference level is essentially a parameter of the 
utility function defining the status quo. However, in our dynamic model, we must address how it 
is updated and exactly how the gain or loss is measured relative to it. The simplest rule is R is set 
at the net purchase price, as defined above, and remains constant between sales.7 That is, when 
the investor sells his stock for Xt, he resets his reference level to KXt  until the next sale. 
However, this is a subjective matter and could differ from investor to investor; there are other 
ways that the new reference level might be set. For instance, an investor might view it as the 
gross amount invested including the purchasing cost, i.e., R = (1ks)Xt. It might also be some 
intermediate level particularly if the transaction costs have different components such as a bid-
ask spread and a commission. Most brokerage accounts show the purchase price which would 
tend to emphasize the net investment as the reference level. On the other hand, the tax cost basis 
includes the purchasing cost which would tend to emphasize the gross investment as the 
reference level. In our analysis, we assume the simplest case that investor fully accounts for costs 
and sets the reference level to the net amount invested, KX.8 
 A related issue is how the investor evaluates his utility burst upon a sale. Again, there are 
several ways he might do so depending on his subjective view of the transaction costs. For 
example, if he ignores costs completely, then the gain is the gross sales value less the reference 
                                                 
7 Throughout this paper we assume the reference level is constant between sales. More generally, it might grow 
deterministically at a constant rate (like the interest rate), or evolve stochastically over time. It could also be updated 
based on recent history of the stock price. 
8 The analysis here is largely unchanged for different ways of setting the reference level. If an investor adopts the 
gross cost view, then equation (5) below has V(KX, (1ks)X) as the second term on the right-hand side. Presumably, 
an investor would not adopt a gross cost view for setting the new reference level as well as recognizing both costs in 
assessing the gain as this would double count the purchasing costs. However, the only requirement for our model is 
that the investor sets his reference level consistently over time. Barberis and Xiong (2012) also adopt the net cost 
interpretation which in their notation is (1k)X with k being the round-trip transaction cost and only consider the full 
recognition of transaction costs in determining gain size. 
5 
 
level, .t t tG X R   If he fully recognizes transaction costs and compares the net reinvested 
amount to the reference level, then .t t tG KX R   If he views the gain as the difference between 
the net proceeds of the sale and the reference level, then (1 ) .st t tG k X R    These three cases 
are covered by defining the gain as ,t t tG X R     and setting the parameter  to 1, K, or 1ks, 
respectively. Intermediate views are also possible. We leave the parameter  free allowing many 
interpretations. 
 The time-consistency of these rules together with the assumptions that (i) the utility 
bursts in (1) are homogeneous of degree  in X and R, (ii) the asset value process has stochastic 
constant returns to scale, and (iii) the investment horizon is infinite jointly guarantee that the 
future looks the same depending only on the current investment and reference level. This 
simplifies our problem in two ways. First, it removes time as an explicit variable. Second, our 
investor always has the incentive to reinvest immediately upon selling a position since he chose 
to enter the market in the first place.  
Denote the value function discounted to time t by V(Xt, Rt). As discussed above, V does 
not depend on time explicitly but only on the current investment and reference level. By 
definition, the value function is the maximized expectation of the sum of future discounted utility 
bursts 
 
{ }
( , ) max ( , )i
i i
i
tt tit t
V X R e GU R  
            (3) 
where  is the rate of time preference,
it
G  and itR  are the dollar size and the reference level for 
the ith future gain, respectively, and it   is the random time it is realized. In our model, these are 
stopping times that are endogenously chosen by the investor to maximize his lifetime expected 
utility.9 To solve the problem posed by (3), we use the time-homogeneity property to rewrite it as 
a recursive expression  
 ( , ) max ( , ) ( , )t t t t t t t tV X R e U R R KX e V KX X
 
  
            (4)  
where  is the time until the next sale. Hereafter, we suppress time subscripts for notational 
convenience unless necessary for clarity.  
At a sale, the value function before the sale must equal the sum of the utility burst of the 
sale and the post-reinvestment continuation value function. So upon a sale realizing X before 
costs, 
 ( , ) ( , ) , ) .V X R U R KX R V KX X     (5) 
Between sales times, equation (4) can be re-expressed using the law of iterated expectations and 
Itô's lemma 
  1 2220 { [ ( , )]} .t t XX Xd e V X R e X V XV dtV       (6) 
                                                 
9 To complete the specification of this maximization, we need to assign a utility value to the policy of never 
executing any sales. The obvious choice in this case is to assign this policy a utility value of zero, the same value 
that would be realized with a policy that allowed sales but never happened to execute any.  
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Because U(G, R) is homogeneous of degree  in G and R and the asset value process has 
stochastic constant returns to scale, V must be also homogeneous of degree  in X and R and 
therefore can be written as ( , ) ( ),V X R R v x where v is the reduced-form value function and  x  
X /R is the gross return per dollar of the reference value.10 The equation for v is  
 2 2120 .x v xv v        (7) 
The general solution to (7) is  
   1 2
2 2 2 21 1
2 2
1 2 1,2 2
( ) 2
( ) where .v x C x C x 
              (8) 
This is true regardless of the form for u. The utility of the sales bursts affects only the constants, 
C1 and C2. Again due to the homogeneity, the optimal sales strategy must be to realize a gain or 
loss when the stock price reaches a constant multiple, , or fraction, , of the reference level.11 
The upper sales point, , must exceed 1/ > 1 as otherwise the sale is not a gain after costs. The 
lower sales point, , must be less than 1.12   
Applying the homogeneity relation (1) to the boundary condition (5) yields the reduced-
form boundary conditions 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) (1), ( ) ( )1 ( ) (1).1v u K v v u K v          (9) 
Equating these to the general solution from (8), we can determine the constants C1 and C2 in 
terms of the policy variables  
 
2 2
1
1 2 1 2
1 1
2
1 2 1 2
( ) ( ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( 1) where ( ) ( ) .
( ) ( ) ( ) (
1) 1
1
)
i
i
c u c uC
c c c c
c u c uC c K
c c c c
 
   

      
             
 (10) 
The optimal sales points,  and , can now be determined either by maximizing C1 + C2, 
                                                 
10 V must be positively homogeneous; i.e.,   0. Since 0 0 0( , ) (1),V X X X v utility is decreasing in the amount of the 
original investment when  < 0, and the investor would always prefer to reduce his initial investment and in the limit 
not participate at all. A positive  also assures that |U(gR, R)| is increasing in R for a fixed g; that is, the higher the 
reference level, the bigger is the utility of a given rate of return. This property is similar to increasing relative risk 
aversion. 
11 See the Appendix for more details on the constancy of the optimal policy. 
12 A sale at any point in the range (1, 1/) produces a subjective loss after accounting for transaction costs. Under a 
constant policy with  in this range, there would never be any sales at a higher price as the stochastic process for x is 
continuous and begins at 1 after each repurchase when the reference level is set to the net investment. But this means 
that only losses with their negative utility bursts would be realized leading to a negative v. This could not be the 
optimal policy as never selling gives a utility of zero as does not participating at all.  
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Figure 1: Determination of the Optimal Sales Policies. This figure illustrates the value func-
tion and the optimal policy for realizing gains and losses. The value in the continuation or no-
sales region is tangent to the sum of the payoff function and the continuation value at each sales 
point,  or . 
▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬ 
which is the value of v(1), or by applying the smooth-pasting condition at both sales points.13 
The solution and the optimal - strategy are illustrated in Figure 1.The no-sales region runs 
from  to . The value function exceeds the sum of the utility burst plus the continuation value 
in this region as illustrated; it is tangent to the payoff including continuation value at  and . 
For some parameter values, it may be optimal to forgo all losses. In these cases, the continuation 
value is not large enough to offset that disutility of realizing a loss. The value function is still 
given by (8) though C2 = 0 and, therefore, v(0) = 0. 
Typical stock and transaction costs values are  = 9%,  = 30%, and ks = kp = 1%. How 
would a realization-utility investor trade this stock? To answer this question, we must specify the 
burst utility function.  A reference-scaled version of the Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT) 
                                                 
13 The optimal sales strategy must maximize v for every value of its argument in the continuation region, and x = 1 is 
guaranteed to be in the continuation region since  < 1 < 1/ < . Note that the smooth pasting condition does not 
simply match the derivative of v to the marginal utility of the burst. It must be applied to (9) which has the continu-
ation value as well as the utility burst on the right-hand side. As discussed in Proposition 1 below, in some cases 
there is a constrained optimum,  = 0, at which the smooth pasting condition does not apply. Unless  > 0 and   
1, there is no unique optimum as many strategies lead to infinite utility. These transversality issues are discussed in 
the Appendix. 
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utility proposed by Tversky and Kahneman (1992), hereafter called scaled-TK utility, is 
 sTK
0
( , ) ( / ) for ( )
( ) 0
G
LsTK sTK
g gU G R R u G R u g
g g



     
 (11) 
with 0 < G, L  1,   1.14 As for CPT, the parameters G and L determine the investor’s risk 
aversion over gains and risk seeking over losses while loss aversion is measured by . The 
scaling parameter satisfies 0    min(L, G). The upper restriction on  ensures the desired 
property discussed earlier that |U(G, R)| is weakly decreasing in R for a fixed G. A nonnegative  
is a participation constraint.  
Tversky and Kahneman (1992) estimated the utility parameters as G = L = 0.88 and  = 
2.25. Since they were not concerned about intertemporal aspects, they did not estimate a discount 
rate nor did they consider scaling. However, for such a low level of risk aversion, the transver-
sality condition is violated and the investor waits forever to realize any gain unless  is nearly 
equal to the expected rate of return.15 For G = L = 0.88 and  = 8%, the investor never 
voluntarily realizes losses unless there is little loss aversion with  close to one.  
However, voluntary loss taking can be part of the optimal policy for other utility para-
meters. Wu and Gonzalez (1996), for example, estimate  = 0.5. Using utility parameters, G = 
L = 0.5,  = 2, and  = 5% the optimal strategy does include voluntary losses for any  less than 
about 0.327.  
Figure 2 shows the optimal sales strategies,  and , plotted against  for different values 
of G and L. Both  and  decrease with  though  falls at a much faster rate, and for a large 
enough loss aversion, the investor refrains from realizing any losses. Provided losses are 
realized, they are always larger than gains in magnitude. This might seem counterintuitive, but 
the smaller gains are realized more frequently, and since marginal utility is decreasing with the 
magnitude of the gain or loss, several small gains more than offset the disutility of a single loss 
of the same total size.  
One common observation about the realization of gains and losses is the disposition 
effect, which has often been claimed to be a consequence of an S-shaped utility function.16 The 
                                                 
14 Setting   G and 0 L GR     reduces (11) to the standard case introduced in Tversky and Kahneman (1992), 
with 0 being their loss aversion parameter. Loss aversion then would vary with R, but the reference level is constant 
in the original static interpretation. The Barberis and Xiong (2012) model is the special case  = G = L = 1. 
15 The restriction on  comes from the transversality condition, G  1. While the required discount rate is large 
relative to those usually assumed, many behavioral finance models do assume that investors are quite impatient. It 
seems reasonable that utility derived from trading gains might well display more impatience than utility for lifetime 
consumption. In addition, this high discount rate could incorporate the hazard rate describing the investor’s ceasing 
this type of trading. Death is sometimes inserted into infinite-horizon models in this fashion, though here the 
termination of trading might be a simple lack of further interest. 
16 Shefrin and Statman (1985) were the first to argue that an S-shaped utility function leads to the disposition effect. 
Similar arguments were made in Weber and Camerer (1998), Odean (1998), Grinblatt and Han (2005), and other 
theoretical and empirical papers.  
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Figure 2: Optimal Sales Policies. This figure illustrates the optimal policies for selling at gains 
or losses as a multiple or fraction of the reference level. The stock price parameters are  = 9%, 
 = 30%. Transaction costs are ks = kp = 1%. Utility parameters are  = 5%,  = 0.25, and G = 
L = 0.3, 0.5, 0.6, as indicated. The investor fully recognizes transaction costs in assessing his 
utility, i.e.,  = K  (1ks)/(1+kp). 
▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬ 
effect, which has often been claimed to be a consequence of an S-shaped utility function.17 The 
reasoning is that the investor realizes his gains as he is risk averse and therefore unwilling to 
gamble about future uncertain gains; however, being risk-seeking over losses he will gamble and 
postpone realizing them. This analysis implicitly assumes something like realization utility 
because any effects of the unrealized gains or losses are ignored. But the argument is static 
considering only a single sale and ignoring any effects of reinvestment, nor does it address the 
question of why any losses are ever realized rather than their being continually postponed. Of 
course, even ignoring reinvestment, the realization of gains might be postponed if the expected 
change in the stock price is sufficiently high so that a larger expected gain in the future offsets its 
extra risk. Conversely, if the mean price change is negative, losses might be realized early to 
avoid larger expected losses in the future while gains would be realized both to avoid risk and to 
avoid smaller expected gains.18 
                                                 
17 Shefrin and Statman (1985) were the first to argue that an S-shaped utility function leads to the disposition effect. 
Similar arguments were made in Weber and Camerer (1998), Odean (1998), Grinblatt and Han (2005), and other 
theoretical and empirical papers.  
18 Henderson (2012) formalizes this argument by examining a diffusion model like ours that allows only a single 
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With concave realization utility, the disutility of a loss can never be offset by the benefit 
of recovering that loss in subsequent gains of the same total size, but as seen in Figure 2 losses 
will be realized as well as gains with an S-shaped utility function.  Losses are substantially less 
common than gains since  is much farther from 1 than is .19 However, in sharp contrast with 
the static argument that an S-shaped utility leads to the disposition effect, the S-shape actually 
serves to reduce the disposition effect in a dynamic context. As G and L decrease and the S-
shape becomes more pronounced, the optimal gain point, , is affected only a little while the 
loss point, , increases dramatically, reducing the disposition effect. The reason is that realizing a 
loss resets the reference level for future possible gains, and this can more than offset the direct 
disutility of the loss. That is, the realization of a loss is, in some sense, the purchase of a valuable 
option. When G is small, this option effect can be substantial since the marginal utility of small 
gains is very large making the disutility of losses “affordable.” 
With intertemporal realization utility, an S-shaped utility function does not create the 
disposition effect; it actually reduces it, explaining why any voluntary losses are realized rather 
than none.20   
As the loss aversion parameter  increases, losses become more painful, and  drops 
discontinuously to zero as shown in Figure 2. The discontinuous change occurs because this 
maximization problem is not a standard convex optimization. As illustrated in Figure 3, the 
reduced value function, v(1), is not a concave function of . Both an interior local maximum and 
a corner local maximum at zero are possible and either can be the global maximum. The high 
marginal disutility of repeated small losses together with transaction costs makes loss taking 
suboptimal for high values of  near 1. On the other hand for low , the continuation value, 
which is proportional to (K), is very small and cannot offset the disutility of a loss. This makes 
avoiding losses altogether ( = 0) better than taking a large loss. Only for intermediate values of 
 is the continuation value possibly sufficient to offset the disutility of a loss. So v(1) attains its 
local maximum value at either  = 0 or an intermediate value.  
Figure 3 illustrates both optimum types for G = L = 0.5 and  = 0.3. The initial reduced 
value function after any sale and repurchase, v(1), is plotted against  for three values of . The 
upper sales point is fixed at its distinct optimal value in each case. For  = 2.5, it is optimal to 
sell for a loss at  = 0.183. For  = 2.56, there is an optimum at  = 0.147, but this is only a local 
maximum as never selling at a loss provides higher utility as shown. For the critical value of   
2.531, both selling for a loss at  = 0.166 and never selling for a loss provide the same expected 
utility. Therefore, the lower sales point, , does not decrease smoothly to zero as  increases; it 
                                                                                                                                                             
liquidating sale with no reinvestment. She finds that losses are voluntarily realized only if  < 0. In contrast to her 
model, our paper shows that reinvestment is important, and as a direct consequence, there is voluntary realization of 
losses even with a positive  of empirically relevant magnitude. 
19 Since returns are lognormal, the proper “distance” comparison is n n ;     also 212 0,   so even if the log 
distances were equal, gains would be realized more often. 
20 Some research suggests that prospect theory may not lead to the disposition effect, e.g., Barberis and Xiong 
(2009), Kaustia (2010), and Hens and Vlcek (2011). In contrast with our model, none of these papers consider 
reinvestment. 
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Figure 3: The Value Function for Scaled-TK Utility. The reduced value function for scaled-
TK utility measured immediately after a sale and reference level reset, v(1), is plotted against 
different loss sales points, . The gain sales point, , is fixed at its optimal value. The solid line 
shows the value function for  = 2.531, the dashed line shows the value function for  = 2.5, and 
the dotted line shows the value function for  = 2.56. The other parameters are  = 9%,  = 30%, 
ks = kp = 1%, G = L = 0.5,  = 0.3,  = 5%  = 1ks. For  = 2.5, the two-point policy ( = 
0.183,  = 1.037) is optimal. For  = 2.56, the one-point policy ( = 1.036) is optimal. For the 
critical value    = 2.531, the two point policy ( = 0.166,  = 1.036) and the one-point policy 
( = 1.036) have the same expected utility. 
▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬ 
drops discontinuously from 0.166 to 0 as  passes the critical value of 2.531. A similar change in 
regime for  is true for the other parameters. The two regimes are characterized in Proposition 1; 
a proof is supplied in the Appendix. 
Proposition 1: Scaled-TK utility has both an upper and a (non-zero) lower optimal sales point if 
and only if λ is less than the critical value  
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determine and .    If  is greater than this critical value, only gains are realized. The solution 
is still characterized by (8), (9), and (10) with C2 set to 0. As  approaches its transversality 
upper limit, 1,   0, and voluntary losses are never realized.  
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The Barberis Xiong (2012) model is a special case of scaled-TK utility with L = G =  
= 1. For this model, or indeed any realization utility model with piece-wise linear utility for gains 
and losses and 0    1, the critical value  is less than 1. Therefore, losses are never realized 
voluntarily.  
2.  The Value Function and Optimal Sales Policies 
The value function or its reduced-form equivalent, v, measures the present value of the 
investor’s utility bursts and gives a point estimate of the benefit of his strategy. It serves the role 
of the derived utility function in a standard Merton-type portfolio problem.   
Figure 4 presents the reduced value function, v, measured at the time of any reinvestment, 
i.e., v(1), plotted against the asset’s expected rate of return, , and standard deviation, . The 
default utility parameters are  = 2,  = 5%,  = 0.3, G = L = 0.5. For the  and  graphs, the 
other parameter is set to  = 30% or  = 9%, respectively. For comparison purposes, each value 
▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬ 
 
Figure 4: The Value Function. The initial optimized value function for scaled-TK utility 
plotted against  and . The default parameters are  = 9%,  = 30%, ks = kp = 1%,  = 0.3,  = 
2,  = 5%, G = L = 0.5. The investor fully recognizes transaction costs in assessing his 
reinvestment gains, i.e.,  = K  (1ks)/(1+kp).  
▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬ 
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function is normalized to 1 at the values  = 9% and  = 30%.21 
Naturally the value function is increasing in . On average for higher , the next trade is 
more likely to be a gain and to occur sooner. The relation is steeper for a larger  because the 
continuation value from the reinvestment is larger due to scaling. The relation is also steeper for 
smaller  since the benefits from future gains are discounted less heavily.  
Surprisingly, the value function is not always strictly decreasing in volatility as it is for a 
standard expected utility maximization; it can be increasing or U-shaped. Of course, CPT inves-
tors are risk-seeking with respect to losses, but that is not the reason for this effect. For example, 
the value function is increasing in volatility in the Barberis and Xiong (2012) model where burst 
utility is piece-wise linear and weakly concave. In our model there are conflicting effects. 
Changing the three parameters, , , and 2 proportionally is identical to a change in the 
unit of time and leaves our model unaffected. So an increase in 2 can be interpreted as a propor-
tional decrease in both  and . Decreasing  lowers the value function as just explained, but 
decreasing  raises the value function since the future net positive bursts are discounted less 
heavily. As explained above, the smaller is , the less important is the  effect. So for small , 
the value function is less steeply decreasing or even increasing in volatility. Also the larger is  
the more important is its effect. So for large , the value function is again less steeply decreasing 
or even increasing in volatility. 
Figure 5 presents graphs of the optimal selling points for gains and losses for scaled-TK 
investors. The parameters left unchanged in each graph are set to the default values  = 9%,  = 
30%, ks = kp = 1%, G = L = 0.5,  = 0.3,  = 2,  = 5%. The dotted lines show the optimal 
policies for an investor who ignores the reinvestment cost in assessing his gains, i.e.,  = 1ks. 
The solid lines show the optimal policies for an investor who does recognize this cost, i.e.,  = 
(1ks)/(1+kp). Several features are immediately evident.  
For both types of investors, realized losses are typically much larger than realized gains 
so the basic strategy is to realize a few large losses and many small gains as we have already 
suggested intuitively. However, the no-sales region is wider for an investor who recognizes the 
reinvestment cost as reducing his gain. An investor who internalizes the costs more when 
assessing his well-being is obviously more reluctant to trade.  
The upper sales point, , is much less affected by parameter changes than is the lower 
sales point, , in most cases. In fact,  is largely unaffected by any of the variables except 
transaction costs and the scaling parameter, . And for , any effect occurs mostly near the 
transversality limit. As  approaches its limit of 1,  drops discontinuously to zero, and  
approaches /[(G)].22   
                                                 
21 Standard utility functions are defined only up to a positive affine transformation. Realization utility has its level 
set so that a gain of zero gives a utility of zero, but scaling is still arbitrary. 
22 For  > 1, there is no well-defined optimal upper sales point. Any 1/( )K   provides infinite expected utility. 
See the Appendix for details on this and other transversality-type violations. When G is very close to 1, the upper 
sales point is sensitive to  and can be decreasing for low .  
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Figure 5: The Optimal Sales Policies for Scaled-TK Utility. The optimal sales points,  and 
, for scaled-TK utility plotted against various parameters. The default parameters in each graph 
are  = 9%,  = 30%, ks = kp = 1%, G = L = 0.5,  = 0.3,  = 2,  = 5%. The dotted lines show 
the optimal policies for an investor who ignores the reinvestment cost in assessing his gains,  = 
1ks. The solid lines show the optimal policies for an investor who recognizes the reinvestment 
cost in assessing his gains,  = K  (1ks)/(1+kp).  
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 On the other hand, the optimal loss-taking strategy does vary substantially as the utility 
parameters change. Increasing  makes losses hurt more so  is lowered in response to avoid 
some of them.  Smaller L leads to higher marginal disutility for small losses. This induces the 
investor to wait longer to realize a loss as his risk-seeking behavior increases (L decreases from 
1 to 0). Conversely for low G, the marginal utility of small gains is quite high making small 
losses “affordable” and desirable to set up future gains. So  decreases with G. Similarly when 
 is small, the pain of realizing a loss is offset more by the lowering of the reference level for 
subsequent gains; this intensifies loss taking, increasing . With a higher , the investor is more 
reluctant to experience a loss just to increase future gains.  
The effect of the subjective discount rate, , on the optimal sales policy is unusual. A 
more impatient investor wants to realize gains sooner and defer losses longer. We see that  is 
decreasing in  as expected; however,  is not. All losses are taken voluntarily, and the desire to 
take gains early induces a derived willingness to realize losses in order to set up these future 
gains. This causes  to also be increasing in  at low discount rates; however, at higher discount 
rates the initial intuition dominates because future gains are discounted more so the benefit of 
resetting is less. 
Increasing the transaction costs, ks and kp, naturally widens the no-sales region because 
the costs take part of each gain and increase every loss. As the costs go to zero, both  and  
approach 1, and the trading frequency increases without limit. Because marginal utility becomes 
infinite as the gain size goes to zero, the investor takes every opportunity to realize even the 
smallest of gains. Of course, there is unbounded marginal disutility for near-zero losses, but 
under the optimal strategy  approaches 1 slower than does , so there is a net increase in the 
value function with frequent trades. 
There is a similar result for any utility function that is strictly concave for gains even if 
their marginal utility is not infinite at zero. There is always an incentive to realize any gain as a 
series of smaller increments because the marginal utility is highest near 0, and in the absence of 
transactions coasts, there is no selling penalty to offset this. However, when the marginal utility 
for gains is not infinite at zero, the loss sales point, , need not be near 1. In the presence of loss 
aversion ( >1), the marginal utility of small losses exceeds the marginal utility of small gains 
which precludes an immediate loss realization even in the absence of transaction costs.  
Changes in  have very little effect on the size of optimal realized gains, . The value 
function is strongly increasing in , but this is due to the reduction in the average time before a 
sale occurs rather than any significant change in policy. The lower sales point, , is affected 
more. For large or small , the option to reset the reference point by selling at a loss is less 
valuable than for intermediate values of . It is less valuable for large  because the asset price 
grows quickly enough for gains to be realized without a painful reset. Conversely, with a very 
low , there is less value in resetting the reference level since future gains will be realized 
infrequently. So  is highest for intermediate values of .23  
                                                 
23 Note that this is very different from the result in Henderson (2012). In her model with neither reinvestment nor 
discounting, losses are only realized to avoid even larger losses on average when  is negative.   
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The standard deviation, , has only a tiny impact on the optimal gain point.  decreases 
as  rises but by amount imperceptible in the graphs. Increasing  also lowers the loss sales 
point, . The reason is, that for typical parameter values, higher volatility would increase the 
probability of loss realization, and the investors responds by lowering  to postpone voluntary 
loss taking. 
3.  Model Calibration 
In this section we calibrate our model using representative investors to determine if it can 
explain observed trading patterns. The model described in the previous sections makes specific 
predictions about the magnitudes, frequencies, and relative proportion of both realized and 
unrealized gains and losses. In this context we explore an alternate utility specification which 
improves the model predictions. We also compare our model results to predictions assuming 
random trading. The best calibration is achieved when we consider heterogeneous trading 
strategies. 
If we consider a single set of utility and stock price parameters, our model predicts that 
the magnitudes of all realized gains and losses are  1 and  1, respectively. The frequency of 
trading is determined by the time required for the investment value to rise to R or fall to R 
from the original reference level R. Paper gains expressed as a percentage of the reference level 
are distributed over the range  1 to  1. The properties of these distributions are given in 
Proposition 2. Its proof and that of all later propositions are provided in the Appendix. 
Proposition 2: Properties of Realized and Unrealized Gains and Losses. If the asset value has 
a lognormal evolution, dX/X = dt + d, and the investor trades repeatedly according to a 
constant two-point policy, -, then the probabilities that a given episode eventually ends with a 
gain or a loss are24  
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24 When 2 = 2 (so  = 0), L’Hôspital’s rule gives 1 1 n n( / )G L L GQ Q            and [] =   
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and in a sequence of consecutive investments, the expected number of investment episodes per 
unit time is 1/[].   
The properties derived in this proposition and Proposition 4 below do not depend on the 
specific realization utility function assumed nor even on the maximization of utility at all. They 
obtain whenever a specific two sales point strategy is employed for assets with lognormal 
diffusions.  
For comparison we want the same type of predictions for investors who may trade for 
liquidity purposes, based on information, or for other reasons. Describing the actions of all such 
investors is outside the scope of this paper so we simply assume that these investors trade stocks 
randomly in separate episodes with each episode terminated independently of the stock price 
evolution. The predictions of this model are given in Proposition 3. 
Proposition 3: Characteristics of Investment Episodes for Random Trades. Assume that 
each asset’s price evolves according to a lognormal diffusion and that each trading episode 
terminates with a sale that occurs according to a Poisson process which is independent of the 
evolution of the stock price and has intensity . The trading episodes have the properties given 
below. 
The duration of each episode has an exponential distribution with mean duration [] = 
1/. The average realized gain and loss are25  
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The probability that a given episode will end with a sale at a gain and the probability that an 
unrealized investment is a paper gain are both 
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Of course, the probability that a given episode will end in a loss and the probability of an 
unrealized loss are 1 1 .L L G GQ Q        
Note that the trading points, and ,  given in (16) are averages. While threshold-
realization-utility investors always trade at fixed ratios, the sales of random traders can occur at 
any price. 
                                                 
25 For  = , L’Hôspital’s rule gives 212( ) .      The expected value of the upper sales, , is finite only if  > ;  is always finite since its realizations are bounded between 0 and 1. 
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One set of trading statistics that has garnered considerable attention was proposed by 
Odean (1998) to measure the disposition effect. These include the proportion of gains realized, 
PGR; the proportion of losses realized, PLR; and the Odean measure, . PGR is defined as a 
ratio. The numerator is the number of realized gains summed over all days and all accounts. The 
denominator is the total over all days of the number of stock positions showing a gain (realized 
or not) in all accounts which realized either a gain or a loss on that day. PLR is similarly defined 
for losses. The Odean measure is the ratio PGR/PLR.  
In a given sample, these statistics will be affected by many factors. These include the 
varying sales thresholds for the distinct assets held by different investors, the number of stocks 
held in each account, the correlation between the stocks’ returns, and the sampling interval.26 
Proposition 4 derives PGR, PLR, and the Odean measure for the special case of independent and 
identically distributed assets. The number of stocks held per account may vary across investors, 
but each individual stock is traded according to the same two-point or random strategy.  
Proposition 4: Odean’s Statistics with a Representative Investor. Assume that asset returns 
are independent and identically distributed with a lognormal evolution, dX/X = dt + d, and 
that all stocks are traded using the same strategy. Then as the number of sales increases, the 
probability limits of PGR, PLR, and the Odean measure are 
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where n and 2n are the average number and variance of the number of stocks held across 
accounts,27 and QG, QL, G , and L are the probabilities defined in (13) and (14) if the investors 
are realization-utility investors or in (17) if the investors are random Poisson traders.  
The statistics of Proposition 4 are the same as those that would be produced by a single 
representative investor holding 2 / nn n rather than n stocks. The representative investor’s 
holding is biased high relative to the average because those investors holding more stocks are 
represented more often in the data. 
With the statistics derived in Propositions 2 through 4, we can assess how our realization 
utility model and the random trading model fit the trading patterns of individual traders. For 
comparison we incorporate data from Odean (1998) and Dhar and Zhu (2006) with the statistics 
generated by this model into Table 1. The first row of the table presents Odean’s data extracted 
from his Tables 1 and 3 including the header text. He reports that 53.8% of sales were realized  
                                                 
26 The effects of these factors are examined in Ingersoll and Jin (2012). 
27 If each account holds a fixed number of assets over time, then n and 2
n are the average and variance of account 
sizes. Under mild regularity conditions, the proposition remains valid for accounts whose sizes vary over time with 
n and 2
n  being the average and variance of the number of shares held per account across both accounts and time. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics for Reference-Dependent Realization Utility Model with 
Scaled Tversky-Kahneman Utility  
The table reports:  1,  1: percentages above and below the reference level for realized gains 
and losses, QG: fraction of episodes that end in realized gains, G: fraction of stocks with unreal-
ized paper gains, []: average holding period in trading days (250 per year), PGR, PLR: propor-
tions of gains and losses realized, and   PGR/PLR: Odean’s measure. Asset parameters are  
= 9% and  = 30%. The accounts’ sizes are fixed with 2 / 8.0.nn n   Utility parameters are  = 
2 and  = 5% (except  = 8% for G = 0.88 and  = 10% for G = 1 to avoid a transversality 
violation). Transaction costs are ks = kp = 1%, and the investor accounts for both costs in his sub-
jective view of his realized gains,  = K. Odean’s data is taken from Tables 1 and 3 of his 1998 
paper. Dhar and Zhu’s data is from the notes to their Table 3. The “Fit to Odean’s , ” row uses 
Odean’s estimates of  and  to compute the other values using Propositions 2 and 4. Each 
“Poisson Model” row choose---s  to match one of Odean’s estimates of , , QG, or [] and 
computes the other values using Propositions 3 and 4; the observed G cannot be matched as the 
Poisson model cannot give values less than 50% when  > 2/2. 
   1  1 QG G [] PGR PLR 
   Odean data          27.7% 22.8% 53.8% 41.9% 312 14.8% 9.8% 1.51 
Dhar & Zhu data ---- ---- 65.8% 46.5% 122 13.2% 6.4% 2.06 
Fit to Odean’s ,  27.7% 22.8% 57.7% 50.7% 174 14.0% 10.9% 1.28 
 
Random Trading (Poisson) Model 
  1  1 QG G [] PGR PLR 
 = 0.36  72.2% 22.8% 58.7% 58.7% 688 12.5% 12.5% 1 
 = 0.80 36.4% 17.4% 55.9% 55.9% 312 12.5% 12.5% 1 
 = 1.16 27.7% 15.2% 54.9% 54.9% 215 12.5% 12.5% 1 
 = 1.94 19.7% 12.4% 53.8% 53.8% 129 12.5% 12.5% 1 
 
Realization Model with Scaled-TK Utility 
   1  1 QG G [] PGR PLR 
1
1
G
L
      
  = 0 or 1 95.3% never 100% 27.1% 3717 34.5% 0  
 = 0.53 45.6% never 100% 16.6% 2087 46.2% 0  
0.88
0.88
G
L
      
 = 0 17.6% never 100% 7.7% 901 65.0% 0  
 = 0.88 96.2% never 100% 27.3% 3743 34.4% 0  
0.5
0.88
G
L
      
 = 0 3.9% 13.5% 80.6% 21.5% 15 34.9% 3.4% 10.22
 = 0.3 5.8% 45.3% 93.8% 9.5% 85 58.6% 1.0% 60.64
0.5
1.0
G
L
      
 = 0 3.8% 6.3% 64.9% 36.7% 7 20.2% 7.3% 2.74
 = 0.3 5.9% 28.2% 87.6% 15.6% 50 44.5% 2.1% 21.64
0.5
0.5
G
L
      
 = 0 4.0% 47.3% 95.9% 6.5% 63 67.8% 0.6% 107.90
 = 0.3 5.7% 75.8% 98.3% 4.9% 169 74.3% 0.3% 293.06
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gains with an average size of 27.7%; the remaining trades were losses averaging 22.8%. The 
average holding period was 15 months which we have expressed as 312 trading days.28 Paper 
gains and losses composed 41.9% and 58.1% of the unrealized positions. PGR and PLR were 
14.8% and 9.8%. Dhar and Zhu’s (2006) data are taken from their Table 1 and the note to their 
Table 3. Gains were realized on 65.8% of trades, but paper gains composed only 46.5% of 
unrealized positions. PGR and PLR were 13.2% and 6.4%.29 The average holding period was 122 
days. They do not report the average sizes of realized gains and losses. The differences in this 
data can probably be attributed to the periods studied. During the Dhar-Zhu period, 1991–6, the 
market rose 113% with only minor corrections while during Odean’s period 1987–93, the market 
rose only 89% and suffered two major downturns. So Dhar-Zhu traders would have reached their 
-points more frequently while Odean’s traders would have had more opportunities to sell at 
losses. 
To determine if any calibration is feasible, the data in the third row uses just Odean’s 
average sales price ratios as estimates for  and . The remaining values are determined from 
them and the stock evolution parameters using Propositions 2 and 4. This fit is not optimized; we 
have simply chosen an asset comparable to a typical share of stock with  = 9% and  = 30%. 
The fit for QG and G, and therefore the corresponding loss statistics, do seem reasonable allow-
ing for sampling error and heterogeneity of assets and investors in the actual sample.30 To 
compute PGR, PLR, and , we need account size information. Goetzmann and Kumar (2008), 
using the same data set as in Barber and Odean (2000), provide more details about portfolio 
sizes. They give the percentages of accounts of various sizes in their Table 1 from which we 
compute approximate values of n = 4.1 and n = 4.0 giving 2 / 8.0.nn n    For a similar data set, 
Barber and Odean (2000) report that the average number of stocks per account is 4.3; Dhar and 
Zhu (2006) give average account sizes of 4.4 and 4.2 for investors whose occupations they 
identify as professional and nonprofessional.  
 
The next four rows of the table illustrate the fit of a trading model based on random 
Poisson trades to Odean’s data. As  increases, both average sales points, and ,   approach 1. 
Under random trading, QG and G must be equal, and both fall from 100% to 50% as  increases 
from 0 to .31 While the individual statistics can be matched, they cannot be fit simultaneously. 
                                                 
28 This calculation assumes 15 months is an exact figure of 312.5 days. The actual value could range from 302 to 
323 days due to rounding. 
29 These are reported in their note to Table 3 using Odean’s method of aggregation. In their Table 2, Dhar and Zhu 
(2006) report simple averages across investors for PGR and PLR of 38% and 17%, respectively. Computing PGR 
and PLR first at the investor level and then averaging across investors puts relatively more weight on investors who 
have fewer stocks in their accounts, and these investors typically have higher PGR and PLR. For instance, suppose 
QG = G = 0.5. Then for an equal mix of investors who hold 2 and 6 stocks, PGR is 0.5 and 0.167. The average PGR 
is 0.33, but using equation (18) with n = 4 and n = 2, the aggregated PGR is 0.2. 
30 Our fitted value of 174 days for [] differs from both Odean’s and Dhar-Zhu’s though it is between them. All of 
the statistics in the last six columns except for [] depend only on the ratio /2 so increasing  and 2 proportion-
ally will reduce [] and leave the others unchanged. In our analysis below it is only the relative holding times for 
different accounts that matters not the level. 
31 If 2 < 2, then both QG and G rise from 0 to 50% as  increases. In this case Odean’s value of QG = 53.8% 
cannot be matched. Conversely, for the parameters used here, G cannot be matched to Odean’s value of 41.9%. 
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In addition, both PGR and PLR must equal 2 1( / )  nn n with random trading so the Odean 
measure must always be 1.  
The final ten rows of the table attempt to fit specific realization utility functions to 
Odean’s data. Using G = L = 0.88 and  = 2.25, as proposed by Tversky and Kahneman 
(1992), and  = 8%, the upper sales point of our model varies from 17.6% to 96.2% above the 
reference level as the scaling parameter, , ranges over its permitted values 0 to 0.88. This does 
include Odean’s estimate of 27.7%, but the fit is far from satisfactory as no losses are voluntarily 
realized for these parameters.  
For piecewise linear utility, G = L = 1 (and  = 10% to avoid transversality violation), 
the table confirms that voluntary loss taking is again never optimal as was shown in Proposition 
1. Gains are realized after the stock price has risen by 95.3% for  = 0 or 1 or by a lesser amount 
for any  between those values. The smallest gain-realization point is 45.6% when  = 0.53. It is 
apparent from the table that realization utility model cannot fit Odean’s data with  values this 
high. 
Tversky and Kahneman’s estimates are from experimental settings with small gamble 
sizes. For the much larger size of investment that a typical investor makes in financial markets 
we expect more risk aversion.32 Therefore, in Table 1 we also use G = 0.5 which is the estimate 
of Wu and Gonzalez (1996).33 This also permits lowering the rate of time preference to a more 
reasonable 5%. Since Wu and Gonzalez only estimate G, we use L in the range 0.5 to 1.0. 
From Table 1 it is apparent that the basic model can generate a wide variety of optimal 
sales points; however, for any parameter values that permit voluntary sales at the size of losses 
observed in Odean’s data, the upper sales point, , is much too low. As a direct result, sales at 
gains vastly outnumber sales at loses (QG  QL) and PGR is too large while PLR is too small. 
One difficulty with scaled-TK utility is that its derivative is very high near zero, indeed 
u(0) =  for any G < 1. This makes the total utility of realizing gains in numerous tiny incre-
ments very large and pushes the optimal threshold, , quite close to 1. This is a particular 
problem in our model because sales, and therefore the sizes of any gains, are not exogenous but 
completely at the discretion of the investor.34  
                                                 
32 Barber and Odean (2000) report that the average household in their sample holds 4.3 stocks worth $47,334, so the 
averaged dollar amount invested per stock a little more than $11,000. In Table 6 of Tversky and Kahneman (1992), 
the largest gamble about which subjects were questioned was $401, which represents a modest 3.6% gain or loss on 
the average stock position.  
33 Wu and Gonzalez (1996) only estimate G. Their estimation depends on the form for the probability weighting 
function. When using that proposed in Tversky and Kahneman (1992), they estimate G = 0.5; using the form 
proposed in Prelec (1998), they estimate of G = 0.48. 
34 The Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion for scaled-TK utility is (1G)/G for uncertain prospects with 
gains only. So if agents have moderate risk aversion for moderately sized gains, they must be extremely risk averse 
about small gambles and close to risk-neutral for large ones. For modified-TK utility introduced below, the Arrow-
Pratt measure is (1G)/(R+G) which has less variation as the size of the gamble changes. 
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To avoid this problem, we consider a modified-TK utility function 
   mKT
[(1 / ) 1] 0
( , )
[1 (1 / ) ] 0 .
G
L
G
L
R G R G
U G R
R G R R G


           
 (19) 
For G < 1 < L, utility is S-shaped; the risk parameters, G and L, are unbounded below and 
above, respectively, allowing more flexibility.35 Marginal utility is bounded at G = 0 reaching the 
values R1 and R1 just below and above zero. This discontinuous change introduces a true 
kink in the utility function.  
Table 2 provides additional calibrated results using the modified-TK utility specification. 
The results presented there are not as extreme as those in Table 1 using scaled-TK utility. In 
particular, the lower marginal utility at small gains has served its purpose of raising the optimal 
gains threshold, . The estimates in the final row, with G = 0.5, L = 30, and  = 0.3, match the 
data quite well. As should be obvious from the parameters, this is not an optimized or best fit; 
rather round numbers are used for G, L, and  which provide a good fit. 
It might well be argued that L = 30 implies an implausibly high risk-seeking behavior, 
so the model is doubtful despite fitting the data. Further parameter adjustments cannot do much 
to improve the fit. For a given threshold-sales policy, -, the remaining values in Tables 1 and 
2, except the average holding time, are completely determined by the ratio /2. Therefore, ad-
justing the utility parameters further cannot better the fit, nor can altering  or  improve the fit 
for PGR and PLR without degrading that for QG and G. However, the calibration can be im-
proved by introducing additional heterogeneities beyond a difference in the number of stocks 
held because this model is not one in which a single average investor can serve as a stand-in for 
the group. 
If investors trade some of their stocks differently (heterogeneous holdings) or different 
investors have different sales policies (heterogeneous investors), there are further aggregation 
effects on the various measures. In particular, the closer are  and  to one, the shorter will be 
the average length of each investment episode. Stocks that are traded more frequently will 
disproportionately affect the statistics because their characteristics will be over-represented. In 
addition the characteristics of the other stocks held in the same account will also be over-
represented as paper gains and losses are counted only when a stock in the same account is sold. 
The effects of aggregation are described in Propositions 5 and 6. Proposition 5 gives the statistics 
when different investors follow distinct trading strategies. Proposition 6 gives the statistics when 
the trading strategies differ for stocks within the same account. These heterogeneities have 
distinct effects. 
Proposition 5: Realization Utility Statistics with Heterogeneous Investors. Assume  
                                                 
35 As usual,  = 0 corresponds to a logarithmic form, Rn(1+G/R). Modified-TK utility can also be adapted to study 
strictly risk-averse incremental utility by setting L < 1. Utility is increasing and for   1 strictly concave. If L = 
G and  = 1, this is incremental power utility; otherwise there is a discontinuous change in risk aversion (if G ≠ L) 
or in marginal utility (if  ≠ 1) at 0. 
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Table 2: Summary Statistics for Reference-Dependent Realization Utility Model with 
Modified Tversky-Kahneman Utility  
The table reports:  1,  1: percentages above and below the reference level for realized gains 
and losses, QG: fraction of episodes that end in realized gains, G: fraction of stocks with unreal-
ized paper gains, []: average holding period in trading days, PGR, PLR: proportions of gains 
and losses realized, and   PGR/PLR: Odean’s measure. Asset parameters are  = 9% and  = 
30%. The accounts’ sizes are fixed with 2 / 8.0.nn n   Utility parameter are  = 2 and  = 5%. 
Transaction costs are ks = kp = 1%, and the investor accounts for both costs in his subjective view 
of his realized gains,  = K. Odean’s data is taken from Tables 1 and 3 of his 1998 paper. Dhar 
and Zhu’s data is from the notes to their Table 3. The “Fit to Odean’s , ” row uses Odean’s 
estimates of  and  to compute the other values using Propositions 2 and 4.  
   1  1 QG G [] PGR PLR 
Odean data 27.7% 22.8% 53.8% 41.9% 312 14.8% 9.8% 1.51
Dhar & Zhu data ---- ---- 65.8% 46.5% 122 13.2% 6.4% 2.06
Fit to Odean’s ,  27.7% 22.8% 57.7% 50.7% 174 14.0% 10.9% 1.28
Realization Model with Modified-TK Utility 
   1  1 QG G [] PGR PLR 
0.5
2.0
G
L
    
 = 0 60.4% 90.7% 96.3% 25.2% 2037 35.3% 0.7% 50.25
 = 0.3 49.2% never 100.0% 17.6% 2221 44.8% 0  
0.5
4.0
G
L
    
 = 0 44.6% 64.1% 85.3% 31.5% 909 27.9% 3.0% 9.36 
 = 0.3 47.4% 73.6% 89.7% 28.3% 1169 31.1% 2.0% 15.45
0.5
8.0
G
L
    
 = 0 27.5% 42.7% 77.6% 33.3% 351 25.0% 4.6% 5.44 
 = 0.3 38.3% 48.7% 77.4% 36.5% 556 23.2% 4.8% 4.80 
0.5
30.0
G
L
    
 = 0 13.5% 17.5% 64.1% 41.0% 67 18.3% 8.0% 2.29 
 = 0.3 26.7% 24.3% 60.5% 48.0% 181 15.2% 9.8% 1.56 
▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬ 
that asset returns are independent and identically distributed36 and that investors differ in their 
trading strategies or number of stocks they hold. Type i investors constitute the fraction i of the 
sample, hold ni stocks, and follow a i-i threshold strategy or a i random strategy. As the 
number of observed trades increases, the probability limits of the various aggregate statistics are 
the weighted averages 
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36 The assets’ means and variances can differ across the types of investors, provided they are identical within types. 
The effects of any asset differences are completely incorporated into , , , , and [ ].i
i i i i
G L G LQ Q     
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and  is any of the statistics , , QG, QL, or []. The probability limits of the fraction of 
unrealized paper gains or losses are 
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
  (21) 
The probability limits of PGR, PLR, and the Odean measure are 
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As before, plim  = plim PGR/plim PLR.  
Proposition 6: Realization Utility Statistics with Heterogeneous Holdings. Assume that a 
representative investor trades N stocks whose returns are independently distributed. These stocks 
are grouped into categories. Within group i, there are ni stocks with identical means, variances 
and trading strategies. The latter are either i-i threshold strategies or i random strategies. As 
the number of observed trades increases, the probability limits of the various aggregate statistics 
are the weighted averages  
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  (23) 
and  is any of the statistics , , QG, QL, or []. The probability limits of the fraction of 
unrealized paper gains or losses are 
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The probability limits of PGR, PLR, and the Odean measure are 
[ ] [ ]
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with plim  = plim PGR/plim PLR as always.  
Table 3 summarizes the calibrated results for heterogeneous investors and heterogeneous 
holdings based on the statistics derived in Proposition 5 and 6. For comparison purpose, we pick 
the utility parameters used in Table 2, excluding the high risk tolerance case which is no longer 
needed for a good fit. All of the averages in this table assume there is an equal mix of two types. 
For “heterogeneous investors,” one half of the investors optimize realization utility and the other 
half trade randomly. For “heterogeneous holdings,” each investor trades one-half of his stocks by 
optimizing his realization utility and trades the other half randomly. 
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Table 3: Summary Statistics for Mixed Reference-Dependent Realization Utility and Random Trading  
The table reports:  1,  1: percentages above and below the reference level for realized gains and losses, QG: fraction of 
episodes that end in realized gains, []: average holding period in trading days, G: fraction of stocks with unrealized paper gains, 
PGR, PLR: proportions of gains and losses realized, and   PGR/PLR: Odean’s measure. Asset parameters are  = 9% and  = 
30%. Transaction costs are ks = kp = 1% with  = K. Odean’s data is taken from Tables 1 and 3 of his 1998 paper. Dhar and Zhu’s 
data is from the notes to their Table 3. The “Fit to Odean’s , ” row uses Odean’s estimates of  and  to compute the other 
values using Propositions 2 and 4. The accounts’ sizes are fixed at 8 which matches 2 /nn n   in the previous two tables. In each 
row under Heterogeneous Investors, one half of the investors are realization-utility traders with utility parameters  = 2,  = 5%, 
and others as stated. The other half of the investors trade randomly with the stated Poisson intensity. In each row under 
Heterogeneous Holdings, each investor trades half his stocks to optimize realization utility and the other half randomly. 
          Heterogeneous Investors       Heterogeneous Holdings    
   1   1   GQ  [ ] G PGR  PLR    G PGR  PLR    
Odean data 27.7% 22.8% 53.8% 312 41.9% 14.8% 9.8% 1.51 41.9% 14.8% 9.8% 1.51
Dhar & Zhu data ---- ---- 65.8% 122 46.5% 13.2% 6.4% 2.06 46.5% 13.2% 6.4% 2.06
Fit to Odean’s ,  27.7% 22.8% 57.7% 174 50.7% 14.0% 10.9% 1.28 50.7% 14.0% 10.9% 1.28
0.5
2.0
G
L
    
=0   =1.5 26.1% 19.5% 57.5% 308 52.1% 13.6% 11.3% 1.21 38.0% 17.8% 8.9% 1.99=1 34.1% 24.2% 59.8% 445 52.0% 14.1% 10.7% 1.32 38.5% 18.1% 8.6% 2.12
=0.3   =1.5 25.1% 19.7% 57.5% 310 51.7% 13.7% 11.2% 1.23 33.7% 19.6% 8.4% 2.34=1 32.7% 24.5% 59.8% 449 51.5% 14.2% 10.6% 1.35 34.3% 19.9% 8.0% 2.48
0.5
4.0
G
L
    
=0   =1.5 26.6% 21.5% 59.1% 282 50.8% 14.3% 10.6% 1.34 41.8% 16.8% 9.1% 1.84=1 33.8% 26.4% 61.7% 392 50.1% 15.0% 9.9% 1.51 42.4% 17.2% 8.7% 1.99
=0.3   =1.5 26.3% 21.2% 58.7% 292 51.1% 14.1% 10.8% 1.31 39.9% 17.4% 8.9% 1.94=1 33.8% 26.2% 61.3% 412 50.5% 14.8% 10.0% 1.47 40.6% 17.8% 8.5% 2.09
0.5
8.0
G
L
    
=0   =1.5 24.6% 23.0% 61.8% 226 47.6% 15.7% 9.4% 1.66 43.3% 16.9% 8.8% 1.93=1 29.4% 27.1% 64.5% 292 46.1% 16.7% 8.6% 1.94 44.0% 17.3% 8.3% 2.09
=0.3   =1.5 26.7% 21.8% 59.6% 256 50.2% 14.5% 10.4% 1.40 44.7% 16.0% 9.4% 1.69=1 33.2% 26.1% 62.1% 345 49.5% 15.2% 9.7% 1.57 45.4% 16.4% 9.0% 1.81
26 
 
Throughout our analysis, stock-level narrow framing is assumed. That is, decisions on 
when to sell are not affected by any other stock’s performance. Therefore, all empirical statistics 
for realized gains and losses depend only on the overall distribution of investing strategies and 
stock parameters; the form of the heterogeneity, whether it is within or across accounts, is irrele-
vant. Specifically, if the stock-level heterogeneity is the same in the “heterogeneous investors” 
and the “heterogeneous holdings” cases, then , , , and [ ]G LQ Q   are identical. However, in 
Odean’s methodology, paper gains and losses are counted by the outside econometrician only 
when another stock in the same account is sold. As a result, the difference between “heterogen-
eous investors” and “heterogeneous holdings” in grouping stocks into accounts yields distinct 
values for the statistics related to paper gains and losses, i.e., , ,G L  PGR, PLR, and . 
Following Odean, ( )G L  is the fraction of stocks trading at a paper gain (loss) when 
some other stock in the same account is sold. Stocks with a lower [] trade more frequently and 
therefore increase the impact of all other stocks held in the same account on G and L and the 
other statistics that depend on these. For example from Table 2, investors with L = 8, G = 0.5, 
and   0 have an average holding period of 351 trading days with G = 33.3%;  = 1 random 
trades have a smaller average holding period of 250 days and a higher G of 55.3%. Therefore, 
with an equal mixture of these investors, the average G = 46.1% is closer to that of the random 
traders since they trade more often. Conversely with heterogeneous holdings, the opposite is 
true; the average G = 44.0% is closer to the threshold-traded stock value. Since random trades 
occur more often, the threshold-traded stocks are the ones observed more often in determining 
the paper gains and losses. As a consequence PGR and  are typically larger and PLR is 
typically smaller for heterogeneous holdings than for heterogeneous investors.  
The reported averages are in fairly close agreement with Odean’s empirical results for 
each level of risk tolerance with no need to resort to the very high risk tolerance required in 
Table 2. The average time between trades has also increased to better match Odean’s value. This 
table simply highlights the possibilities. Using mixtures of other than 50-50, including more 
types of investors, or allowing heterogeneity of trading strategies both across investors and 
within the same account would permit further tweaking of the fit.  
In summary, we have shown that our realization utility model is consistent with and can 
shed light on several dimensions of observed trading data. We have made no attempt to match 
the empirical patterns exactly, nor have we considered all dimensions. For instance, in his 1998 
paper, Odean reports the average size of paper gains and losses measured when some other stock 
in the same account was traded. The average paper gain and loss were 46.6% and 39.3%, which 
are larger in magnitude than the realized gains and losses of 27.7% and 22.8%. Our model with 
a single representative investor following an identical - strategy on all the stocks cannot 
possibly generate this pattern as the realizations occur at the extreme points of the paper gains 
and losses distribution. Although it is possible to generate this pattern by considering an 
economy with heterogeneous investors, other explanations are also possible such as investors 
updating their reference levels based on the recent price history of the asset.37 Once the reference 
                                                 
37 See section IV of Odean (1999) for an informal discussion on this. Related experimental and empirical evidence 
can be found in Gneezy (2005) and Arkes, Hirshleifer, Jiang, and Lim (2008, 2010). 
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level changes from the initial purchase price, the subjectively measured gain or loss realized by 
an investor differs from the gain or loss as measured objectively by an outside econometrician. 
This topic is examined in detail in Ingersoll and Jin (2012).  
4. Voluntary Loss Realization 
One of the main objectives of this paper is to create an intertemporal realization utility 
model with voluntary loss realization. In earlier sections we introduced scaled- and modified-TK 
utility functions, and our numerical analysis shows that either can generate voluntary loss taking. 
In this section, we pose a more general question: what are the necessary characteristics for any 
utility function to generate voluntary sales at losses in the intertemporal realization utility 
framework posed in (3)? We are not ruling out other possible preference or belief-based explana-
tions that contribute to voluntary loss taking such as changes in information or portfolio rebal-
ancing. Nevertheless, our general analysis may shed light on theoretical and experimental work 
on realization utility and the disposition effect. 
Both versions of TK utility have two properties that separately seem important, an S-
shape and reference scaling. To illustrate, consider an investor with the scale-free utility 
function, U(G) = sgn(G)|G|1/2 that does not explicitly depend on the reference level. This 
investor might be willing to realize a loss of 2 since, if the price subsequently recovers, he can 
take two gains of 1 and have positive total utility. Not taking the loss of 2 prevents realizing the 
recovery as a gain. With scale-free concave utility, the benefit of a recovery gain can never offset 
the disutility of the loss because marginal utility is decreasing so the disutility of the loss must be 
larger than the utility of subsequent gains no matter how it is divided. Now consider a simple 
scaled utility function with no convexity for losses, U(G, R) = G/R. A loss from 4 to 2 has a 
disutility of 2/4 while a recovery from 2 back to 4 provides a utility of 2/2. Now the decreasing 
scaling may make taking the loss worthwhile in order to realize a later gain. Conversely, with 
increasing scaling, loss taking could never be optimal.  This analysis is made precise in 
Proposition 7 below which describes the conditions under which losses will never be realized 
voluntarily.  
Proposition 7: Assume that an investor maximizes expected realization utility as in (3) with a 
burst utility function of U(G, R) and that the reference level is updated to the investment value 
after a sale but remains constant between sales. The following four conditions  
 
2 2
2(i) 0 0 (iii(ii ) 0 (iv) 0)
U
G G R
U U
G
           (26) 
are jointly sufficient to preclude the voluntary realization of any losses in the absence of 
transaction costs.38  
                                                 
38As seen in Figure 5, transaction costs widen the no-sales region and therefore make voluntary loss taking less 
likely to occur. With transaction costs we would require stronger violations of these conditions to make voluntary 
loss taking optimal.  
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A proof of this theorem is given in the Appendix. The intuition for the result is that the 
disutility of a loss cannot be offset by the utility of any later gains that recoup this loss because 
each gain utility burst comes at a later time, has a smaller marginal utility, and has a lower 
reference level. Each of these aspects makes the gain utility smaller by properties (i), (iii), and 
(iv), respectively. 
The first three conditions in (26) are standard utility properties. Time preference is posi-
tive, and marginal utility is positive and decreasing. Taking the first two as inviolable, voluntary 
losses are then possible only if utility is not everywhere concave or marginal utility is not 
everywhere increasing in the reference level. We have already discussed the option-like effect 
that S-shaped utility has on loss taking from resetting the reference level. A violation of condi-
tion (iv), that is, marginal utility is decreasing in the reference level over some range, can have 
the same effect. A loss measured from a high R can have a smaller negative impact on utility 
than the same size gain from a lower R. This might induce the investor to realize a loss so he is in 
position to take a later gain when the asset recovers in value.  
S-shaped utility functions are commonly used in behavioral models, and we have already 
argued that |U(G, R)|/R ≤ 0 is a likely description of realization utility which, if true, means 
(iv) cannot hold except when 2U/GR  0.39 Therefore, both S-shaped utility and decreasing 
scaling of utility with respect to R may contribute to the optimal voluntary realization of losses. 
In theory a violation of (iii) or (iv) alone is sufficient to make voluntary loss taking optimal. 
However, our model calibration indicates that both are probably necessary to explain the data.  
5.  Further Model Predictions and Applications 
 As discussed above, our paper makes several direct and specific predictions about trading 
activity.40 The two-point, -, trading strategy is quite specific about the volume of gains and 
losses, the holding periods, and the sizes of both realized and paper gains and losses. These 
results can help to explain the difference between the trading volume in rising and falling 
markets as well as the effect of historical highs on the propensity to sell. Together, risk-seeking 
behavior and the trading strategy might also explain the heavy trading of highly valued assets 
since the optimal strategies are related to the assets’ means and variances. Furthermore, if an 
investor’s subjective reference level is not constant but is updated based on recent stock prices, 
then the predicted trading patterns become path-dependent. 
Models like this one may also rationalize hazard-rate types of models for investor 
behavior. In a recent paper, Ben-David and Hirshleifer (2012) document a V-shape empirical 
pattern between the probability of selling a stock and the unrealized return since purchase for 
fixed holding periods. Using the statistics developed in Proposition 5 for heterogeneous 
                                                 
39 Letting subscripts denote partial derivatives, 2 2 120( , ) (0, ) ( , ) .
GU G R U R U g R dg   Since U(0, R) = 0 for all R, 
U2(0, R) = 0. If (iv) holds strictly, i.e., U12 > 0, then the integral is positive (negative) for positive (negative) G, and 
|U|/R > 0. Therefore, assuming (iv), the relation |U|/R  0 cannot hold except when U12  0. 
40 A more detailed discussion on some of these applications can be found in Barberis and Xiong (2012). 
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investors, our model can match this pattern.41 Many of these considerations are examined further 
in Ingersoll and Jin (2012). 
Tax-trading behavior is another obvious topic addressed by this model. In fact, capital 
gains are a near perfect fit with realization utility since they are typically due only upon sale of 
an asset. Standard reasoning indicates that an investor should realize losses and defer gains to 
minimize the tax burden. With taxes loss taking should predominate over gain taking which is 
the opposite of the disposition effect. However, this reasoning again fails to recognize the 
importance of the reinvestment effect. To illustrate, consider an investor with modified-TK 
utility with G = 0.5, L = 4,  = 0.3,  = 2,  = 5% investing in an asset with  = 9% and  = 
30% and paying 1% transaction costs. In the absence of a capital gains tax, the investor would 
sell at  = 1.460 or  = 0.261.42 With a 15% capital gains tax, he sells at  = 1.549 or  = 0.248. 
The capital gains tax does cause the investor to postpone the realization of gains because they 
now provide a smaller utility burst. However, loss taking also is postponed precisely because 
gains are less valuable so it no longer is quite so advantageous to realize a painful loss to reset 
the reference point. Of course, loss taking is affected less than gain taking because of different 
tax treatment. 
Our model also makes other indirect predictions. Two such predictions are the flattening 
of the capital market line and the pricing of idiosyncratic risk. There is no equilibrium model in 
our paper so precise predictions are not possible, but the model does indicate directional effects. 
The - indifference curves for a realization-utility investor are flatter than the observed 
capital market line and, in some cases, are actually decreasing with the investor preferring more 
variance to less. But out model does not address to what these indifference curves should be 
applied. If an investor holds only a diversified mutual fund, the model indicates he should 
display less risk aversion than typical in the selection of a fund. But it also seems plausible that 
investors might save the bulk of their wealth in diversified portfolios recognizing that those are 
the best vehicle for long-term saving43 and still actively trade other stocks because they enjoy 
doing so. Only this latter investment activity might be governed by realization utility of the type 
we have modeled. This might explain why we see only a small number of stocks in typical 
trading accounts. 
With flatter indifference curves, there will be an excess demand for high-variance stocks. 
This means that high-beta and high residual risk stocks should have smaller expected returns 
than predicted by equilibrium models like the CAPM. Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang (2006) 
                                                 
41 Ben-David and Hirshleifer (2012) implicitly assume that investors trading is random with hazard rate (intensity ) 
that is a function of holding period and the size of the unrealized gain. In contrast in our model with heterogeneous 
investors, the representative investor is not an average investor, and the hazard rate measures an aggregation effect.  
42 For consistency in the comparison, we assume that the investor views his subjective gain as the taxable gain and 
resets his reference level to the new cost basis even if the tax rate is zero. That is, he uses the gross cost view of 
setting his reference level as discussed in footnote 8. 
 
43 In a Swedish data set, Calvet, Campbell, and Sodini (2009) find that the asymmetry between selling winners and 
selling losers is much weaker for investors’ holdings of mutual funds than for their individual stocks, suggesting that 
households’ motive for mutual funds investment is different from individual stocks investment. 
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document this. They test alphas for stocks with different total and residual volatilities and find 
just this result. The difference between the alphas of the highest and lowest volatility stocks is 
1.35% (t = 4.62) for the CAPM and 1.19% (t = 5.92) for Fama-French three-factor model. 
The difference in alphas between the highest and lowest residual volatility stocks is 1.38% (t = 
4.56) for the CAPM and 1.31 (t = 7.00) for FF-3.  
Precise predictions are, unfortunately, not possible, because we have ignored modeling 
diversification directly. In a standard portfolio model, risk-averse investors optimally hold many 
assets to provide diversification.  Our model assumes narrow framing with the utility from each 
investment depending solely on how it is traded. It might seem, therefore, that there is no benefit 
from diversification. However, this is not true. For utility that is homogeneous of degree  as we 
have assumed, the value of investing wealth W in several assets in proportions wi and subse-
quently reinvesting each portion without any rebalancing is ( ) (1)i i iw W v
 where vi is the 
separate valuation of asset i that depends on its mean and variance and the specific utility 
function. For 0 <  < 1, utility is maximized with 1/( 1)[ (1)] .i iw v  Of course, this portfolio is 
generally not optimal absent the just-assumed no-rebalancing restriction, but it does demonstrate 
that investing in a single stock is a dominated policy so some diversification must be optimal. A 
more thorough analysis would show that when rebalancing is allowed, investors should deviate 
from a strictly constant - policy whenever their allocations stray too far from the optimal. 
However, before diversification and rebalancing can be studied completely, a more 
fundamental question must be answered: How are separate gains and losses aggregated under 
realization utility? Our model assumes complete narrow framing both across assets and over 
time. All utility bursts are evaluated separately and then their discounted values are summed over 
different assets and time periods. In a different model investors might aggregate contemporan-
eous gains and losses into a single utility burst and sum those over time. Both assumptions are 
psychologically plausible, but either creates problems in multi-period models, particularly 
continuous-time models.  
If the utility function aggregates contemporaneous gains and losses, and the investor’s 
utility is S-shaped, losses on different assets should be taken simultaneously if possible because 
marginal utility is decreasing in the magnitude of losses. This will lead to timing complications 
with investors postponing some loss taking while accelerating other losses to achieve synchro-
nicity. On the other hand, gains on different assets should always be kept separate in time since 
their marginal utility is decreasing. This is trivial to achieve in continuous time with time-
additive utility which so narrowly frames the time dimension that a separation of dt is sufficient 
for a completely independent evaluation. But is it reasonable to assume that two gains realized 
simultaneously have a different utility than the same two gains realized only instants apart? And 
if not, how long a time separation is required? Similar questions have arisen in the standard 
consumption-portfolio problem and various suggestions like recursive utility or Hindy, Huang, 
and Kreps (1992) intertemporal aggregation have been made. The question here is more difficult 
because consumption is naturally smoothed in intertemporal models, but here we have both 
smoothing of gains and lumping of losses to address. 
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6.  Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, we have built an intertemporal realization utility model to study investors’ 
trading behavior. Highlighting the role reinvestment plays in a dynamic context, we have shown 
that investors may voluntarily realize losses even though this has an immediate negative utility 
impact. The necessary condition for voluntary losses is either risk seeking behavior over at least 
some losses or decreasing scaling under which the magnitude of the utility of gains and losses 
realized with smaller reference levels is larger.  
Under our model a two-point sales strategy is optimal; an investor sells for a gain when 
the asset value rises to a fixed multiple of the reference level or sells at a loss at a fixed fraction 
of the reference level. We have provided a detailed calibration of the model showing that the 
trading data of Odean and others is in close agreement with such two-point strategies but is 
inconsistent with random trading that is independent of the potential gain. We also introduced a 
modified form of Tversky-Kahneman utility which predicts, either alone or in a model of 
heterogeneous investors, the average realized gains and losses observed in the data. 
We have discussed some properties predicting trading patterns and price effects. In 
particular, our model suggests a flattening of the capital market line and that idiosyncratic risk 
could have a negative risk premium. Both of these features also are seen in the data. But other 
effects still need to be investigated. For example, how do trading patterns and volume evolve 
over time in different markets? What is the relation between realization utility and momentum?  
There are several directions for future theoretical research. One important step is to study 
the diversification motive of realization-utility investors and solve a full portfolio problem. We 
do know that some diversification and rebalancing is optimal, but this means that the optimal 
sales strategy for a stock depends not only on its reference level but also on the prices and 
reference levels of the other assets held in the portfolio. In addition, assumptions must then be 
made on how contemporaneous and near-contemporaneous gains and losses are subjectively 
aggregated and about the proper reference level for a position that consists of shares purchased 
for different prices at different times. 
It is also important to understand how realization utility interacts with other types of 
utility. Do investors also receive utility just from holding assets with paper gains even if they do 
not sell? Clearly investors also value consumption; are the motives to smooth consumption and 
to realize gains evaluated separately or combined somehow?  
Finally if an S-shaped utility function is important, does probability weighting also have 
an effect on realization utility? It is a non-trivial task to incorporate probability weighting into an 
intertemporal setting because the law of iterated expectations does not hold if probabilities are 
replaced by decision weights. As shown in Barberis (2012) and Ingersoll (2012), cumulative 
probability weighting typically induces time inconsistency, and certain rules that define 
economic actions need to be imposed in order to further model this type of behavior. 
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Appendices 
 
A: Notation 
 
TABLE OF IMPORTANT NOTATION 
=============================================================== 
 Expectations operator 
G Dollar size of a gain or a loss 
ks Proportional transaction cost for selling stock 
kp Proportional transaction cost for purchasing stock 
K Round-trip proportional transaction cost for selling the current asset being held and 
reinvesting in another asset, K  (1  ks)/(1  kp)  
n  Average number of stocks held in a single investment account 
  The Odean measure of the disposition effect,   PGR/PLR 
PGR Proportion of gains realized 
PLR Proportion of losses realized 
R The reference level 
QG The probability that a given investment episode eventually ends with a realized gain 
QL The probability that a given investment episode eventually ends with a realized loss  
S The stock price 
U The utility burst function U(G, R) 
u The reduced form utility burst function u(G/R)  RU(G, R) 
V The value function V(X, R) 
v The reduced form value function v(x)  RV(X, R) 
X The level of investment  
x Gross return per dollar of the reference level, x  X/R 
G Parameter of risk aversion for gains in evaluating utility bursts 
L Parameter of risk seeking for losses in evaluating utility bursts 
  The scaling parameter gauging the impact of the reference level, R, on utility bursts  
1, 2 Characteristic roots of the partial differential equation, defined in equation (8) 
 The subjective discount rate 
   Defined parameter    1  2/2 
 Optimal sales multiple for a gain; sale occurs at X = R 
 Optimal sales fraction for a loss; sale occurs at X = R 
 Parameter measuring the subjective effect of transaction costs in evaluating utility bursts 
 Loss aversion parameter 
 Growth rate of the stock price 
 Poisson intensity for random trading 
 Logarithmic standard deviation of the stock price 
n Standard deviation of number of stocks held in investment accounts 
 Duration of an investment episode from purchase to sale 
G The fraction of time an asset has an unrealized paper gain 
L The fraction of time an asset has an unrealized paper loss 
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B: Verification of the Optimality of Constant Proportional Sales Policies 
Consider the general sale and reinvestment problem given in the text. For any given real-
ized stochastic price path and sales policy denote the original stock price by S0 and the stock 
prices at the points of sale, occurring at times 1 2, , , ,nt t t by 21, , , ,nS S S etc. The number of 
shares purchased at price Sn and sold at price Sn+1 is Nn. The dollar amount under investment 
is nX
   NnSn just after the purchase at tn and 1n n nX N S   just before the sale that finances this. 
These amounts differ by the round trip transaction cost so the relations among the X’s are given 
by the recurrences 
 1 1(1 ) /(1 ) / .n s n p n n n n nX k X k KX X X S S
    
       (A1) 
 The reference level, Rn, established after the sale and repurchase at tn is nX
 if the investor 
considers both sets of transaction costs. Alternatively he might ignore the repurchase costs set-
ting Rn = (1 ) (1 ).n s n pX k X k
    To cover both of these and many other cases we define Rn = 
.nK X
  The subjective rate of return realized on the gain at time tn and its utility burst are 
  
1 1 1
1 1
/ 1 ( ) / 1 ( / ) / 1
( / ) /
/
1 .n
n n n n n n
t
n n n
X R X X K S S
e R u K S S
K    
 
 
        
    (A2) 
Using the recursion relations in (A1) 
 1 1 0 0/ / .
n
n n n n n n nR K X K KX K KX S S K K X S S
   
          (A3) 
Total utility is therefore 
  10 0 1
1
( ) [ ( / )] ( / ) / 1 .jt j j j j
j
X K e K S S u K S S    

      (A4) 
The same relation holds looking ahead from any point in the future. 
 
Now consider a rule that generates the optimal sales policy. It sets gain and loss sales 
points for the first sale of 1 0( )S S and 01( )S S and sets contingent rules for the second sales points, 
2 1( )S S  and 12( ),S S etc. These optimal policies cannot depend on time since the stochastic process 
is time homogeneous and the investor has a constant subjective discount rate. Nor can the opti-
mal policies depend on the current state, 0 ,X
 since from (A4) realized utility depends only on the 
proportional scaling factor 0( )X
  and the price ratios which have stochastic constant returns to 
scale and are independent.  Consequently, the optimal policy must be a constant sales policy.  
It is clear from this analysis that constant proportional transaction costs, a constant and 
proportional subjective interpretation of the realized return and reference level ( and K), a stock 
price process with independent and identically distributed returns, a constant rate of time prefer-
ence, an infinite horizon, and a utility based on rates of return with power scaling factor are all 
necessary for a constant optimal policy. 
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C: Transversality Conditions 
There are several different conditions required in our analysis to keep the value function 
finite and produce a well-defined optimal trading strategy. First the discount rate must be large 
enough or utility bursts far in the future will dominate the value function and make it unbounded. 
This restriction mimics the transversality conditions in the standard portfolio problem. Second 
the scaling parameter  must be not too large otherwise repeated selling lets total utility accumu-
late too quickly by increasing the reference level and thereby the utility bursts of future sales. 
Finally, transaction costs cannot be zero or the investor can repeatedly realize small gains with 
their very high marginal utility. 
To see that  and  must be restricted, suppose an investor adopts a constant sales policy, 
, and never sells at a loss. With each sale the reference level increases by the factor K so the 
reference level for nth sale will be Rn = 11( ) .
nR K   The nth sale has a subjective gain of   1 
per dollar of the reference level. The expected lifetime utility from a series of sales at gains and 
no sales at losses is  
 1
1 1
( 1) ( 1) ( ) [ ] .
( )
n nt tn
n
n n
Re R u u K e
K
   

 
        (A5) 
Here nt is the random time of the nth sale. Note that the utility bursts realized are known; it is 
only the timing that is random. Since the times between successive sales are independent and 
identically distributed 
  11 2 1 1( )( )[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ,n n n nt t tt t t te e e e e                 (A6) 
and the final sum in (A5) is  
  1
1
( ) [ ]
nt
n
K e
 

    (A7) 
which converges if and only if 1( ) [ ] 1.tK e    The expected value in (A7) depends on  
through the stopping time 1,t  but unless  > 0, it is at least one for any  so the sum is 
unbounded for any  > 1/K and infinite utility is possible. Therefore  must be positive just as in 
the standard infinite-horizon investment problem. 
The expectation in (A7) is a particular value of the Laplace transform44 of the first-
passage time density of the random variable, Xt, to R; that is, 
                                                 
44 The Laplace transform of a density function, ( ( )) [ ],stf t e  can be easily determined from the moment 
generating function, ( ( )) [ ],stf t e  for a negative argument. The Laplace transform is defined for all values of  
(unlike the moment generating function) since the first passage time is a positive random variable. 
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where 1 is the positive exponent in the solution of the differential equation for valuation as 
given in (8). Therefore, for the sum in (A7) to be bounded, we also require 
   1 11 ( ) [ ] .tK e K        (A9) 
The feasible policy choices are  > 1/  1, so infinite utility can be achieved if  > 1 
with any feasible 1/( ) .K     If 0    1, then the sum converges for all feasible policies.45 
Combining these results, necessary conditions for there to be no investment plans which lead to 
infinite expected utility are 
 1 and 0 .      (A10) 
These conditions depend only on the scaling and the discounting of the burst utility function and 
are required whatever the functional form of the reduced utility u().  
However, these conditions are not sufficient. Unbounded utility can also be achieved if 
the growth rate of the asset is too large. Suppose an investor adopts a gains-only policy ( = 0), 
then from (10) in the text, C2 = 0. And as   , the initial value function is   
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(A11) 
since   1. This is clearly unbounded if G > 1; therefore, a necessary condition for no 
transversality violation is G  1 or in terms of the exogenous parameters 
  212[ ( 1) ] .G G         (A12) 
This restriction is similar to the transversality condition found in the standard infinite horizon 
portfolio problem. For linear utility over gains,  cannot exceed the discount rate, but risk 
aversion expands the set of admissible values for .46 
                                                 
45 We have assumed that   0 to ensure participation; however, if  < 0, then the sum in (A7) might diverge for   
1. The minimum feasible value for  is 1/, so the convergence condition is 11 .K     If the investor is 
subjectively fully cognizant of all transaction costs then  = K, and this condition is met; otherwise for   K, the 
lower bound on  is 1n()/n(/K).  
46 The interpretation of this transversality violation is that for any sufficiently high policy, , choosing an even high-
er policy will increase expected utility. As   , sales will become increasingly rare but never cease altogether so 
expected utility continues to rise. This limiting result should not be confused with the ex ante policy of never selling, 
which is assigned zero utility.  
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Finally unbounded utility can be achieved for scaled-TK utility47 if there are no 
transaction costs so there is also no well-defined optimal strategy in the absence of costs. To 
demonstrate this, we construct a sequence of feasible sales strategies and show that as the 
transaction costs go to zero, the constructed strategies lead to unbounded utility. Therefore, the 
optimal strategy must also yield infinite utility in the limit of zero costs.  
Consider a sequence of economies indexed by k. We assume that the sales and purchase 
costs are in the same proportion for each step of the sequence, that is, ks = k and kp = ck for some 
c  0. At each step the sales policies considered are 
 0 1 10 1 2,1 , where 0 ,/ ) 1 .(1 k k k
            (A13) 
These are not assumed to be the optimal strategies only feasible ones. 
Initial utility is v(1) = C1 + C2 where these constants are defined in (10). Using a Taylor 
expansion for small k, the functions determining C1 and C2 are48  
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 (A14) 
The constants are  
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 (A15) 
If we choose the convergence rates, ω0 and ω1, such that ω0/ω1 > (1L)/(1G), then from (A15) 
it is easy to verify that 1 2 ,as 0.,C C k  So this strategy gives infinite utility in the limit and 
the truly optimal strategy must as well. 
D: Proof of Proposition 1 
As illustrated in Figure 2 there can be two local maxima to our optimization problem. 
                                                 
47 Unbounded utility can be achieved for scaled-TK utility by realizing a series of infinitesimally sized gains because 
u(0+) = , and with no transactions costs, nothing prevents the investor from doing so. Unbounded utility cannot be 
achieved in the same way with modified-TK as its marginal utility is bounded. 
48 Given that ω0 and ω1 are both less than ½, all the terms associated with c are included in the higher-order terms 
02( )o k  and 12( ).o k    
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The one-point maximum is a corner solution with  = 0; the two-point maximum is an interior 
maximum with  > 0. Which local maxima is the global maximum depends on the specific 
economic and utility parameters, but it can be most easily characterized by the loss aversion 
parameter, . The value function for the one-point maximum does not depend on  since no 
losses are ever realized. The value function for the two-point maximum is obviously decreasing 
in . Therefore, there is a single critical value of  at which the two value functions are equal 
marking the change in regime.  
Denote the two-point and one-point value functions as 1 2(2) (2) (2)1 2( )v x C x C x
   and v(1)(x) 
1(1)
1 .C x
  Since, for the critical value of *, the value functions are equal everywhere that they 
are defined, we must have (2)1C  (1)1 1C C and ( 2 )2 0.C  From (9), the boundary conditions are 
 1 11 1 1 1( 1) ( ) ( 1) ( )C u K C C u K C
               (A16) 
The smooth-pasting conditions for a maximum are 
1 11 11 1
1 1 1 1 1 1( 1) ( 1) .C u K C C u K C
                          (A17) 
The two boundary conditions in (A16) must yield the same value for C1; therefore, 
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Similarly, from (A17) 
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Substituting the scaled-TK utility function into (A18) and solving for * gives 
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Combining (A18) and (A19) gives  
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These equations can be re-expressed as  
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Substituting back into (A20) gives  
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which is the desired expression in (12).  
Correspondingly for modified-TK utility introduced in the calibration session, (A18) now 
gives  
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instead of (A20), and (A19) together with (A18) now give 
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Together (A24) and (A25) give 
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in place of (A23). 
As   1 from below, both (A21) and (A25) yield 1/( ) 0.K       Substituting this 
into either (A23) or (A26) gives *  0, which implies that voluntary loss realization will never 
take place in this limiting case since   1 > *.   
E: Proofs of Propositions 2 to 6 
Proof of Proposition 2: The ultimate resolution probabilities for a single episode, which were 
given in (13), can be determined from the time-independent backward equation  
 2 2120 .x q xq      (A27) 
The time-invariant probability of any event measurable in terms of the current variable x is a 
solution to this equation. Solving (A27) with boundary conditions q() = 0 and q() = 1 gives 
the probability that x will reach  before it reaches  conditional on the current value of x 
 2
2( ) where 1 .xq x
 
 
         (A28) 
The ultimate resolution probabilities in (13) are QG = q(1), QL = 1  QG.  
To determine the expected duration of an investment episode, note that the process   
21
2n ( )tx t    is a martingale starting at 0. Since the times of sales are stopping times for the 
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process, the martingale stopping time theorem gives 
 2 21 12 20 [ n ( ) ] n n ( ) [ ]G Lx Q Q                     (A29) 
from which (15) is immediate. 
Over repeated investment episodes, the stochastic process for x  X/R is a Markov 
process with bounded support, x  (, ). It is a diffusion everywhere except at x =1, , and . It 
is not a diffusion at those points because whenever x reaches either boundary, it returns immedi-
ately to x = 1 due to the sale and reinvestment. The steady-state distribution of x is the solution to 
the Kolmogorov forward equation 
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(A30) 
The density must vanish at the boundaries just as it does with an absorbing barrier because the 
infinite variation in the diffusion process assures that the barrier will be reached with probability 
approaching unity whenever the diffusion enters a small neighborhood of the barrier. 
Since x is not a diffusion at 1, the differential equation does not hold at that point, and the 
equation must be solved separately in the two regions then pieced together. The general solution 
to the differential equation is Ax1 + Bx1 where   1  2/2, and the two constants differ in 
the two regions. The two boundary conditions, the continuity of the density at x = 1, and the unit 
mass of f over the entire region supply the four equations needed to determine the four constants. 
The density and cumulative distribution function are 
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The probabilities in equation (14) are G = 1  L = 1  F(1).   
Proof of Proposition 3: It is well-known that the duration of each episode of a Poisson process 
has an exponential distribution with probability density et. At the end of an episode lasting , 
n x has a normal distribution with mean (  2/2) and variance 2. Therefore, the expected 
price ratios conditional on a sale at a gain and a loss are  
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 (A32) 
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with    required for  to be finite.  
The probability, H(x), that a given episode eventually events with a loss conditional on 
the current asset value ratio, x = X/R, satisfies the modified backward equation  
 2 21 120 ( ) subject to  (0) 1, ( ) 0xx H xH H H H          1  (A33) 
where 1x < 1 is the indicator function that the asset currently has a paper loss. This final term is the 
probability per unit time that H changes discontinuously to one (zero) if a sales event occurs 
when x is less (greater) than 1 resulting in a realized loss (gain). Solving this equation in the two 
regions and matching it and its derivative at the boundary x = 1 gives  
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 (A34) 
The probabilities that a new investment episode ends in a sale at a loss and gain are 
(1)LQ H  and 1 (1).GQ H   Since the Poisson events determining sales are independent of the 
stochastic process of the stock price, the probability of realizing a loss for any episode must 
equal the steady-state probability of holding an unrealized paper loss; that is, .L LQ   Similarly 
for gains, 1 (1).G GQ H       
Proof of Proposition 4: In a given sample of T observed sales, the observed proportion 
of gains realized is49     
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Since each stock has an equal probability of being sold in the steady state, by the Weak Law of 
Large Numbers, the fraction of trades made by accounts holding n shares converges to /nn n  
                                                 
49 Consistent with the empirical implementation of Odean (1998), the calculation in (A35) counts paper gains and 
losses only when at least one stock is sold in the account. Also (A35) assumes that each trade involves the sale of a 
single asset in a given account. This is justified in a continuous-time model since two less than perfectly correlated 
assets will never reach their sales thresholds simultaneously with probability one. 
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where n is the fraction of investors who have n stocks in their accounts, and 
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 (A36) 
From Slutsky’s Theorem, that the probability limit of a function of random variables is equal to 
the same function of the separate probability limits, the plim of PGR is the ratio of these two 
quantities. Similar reasoning derives the plim of PLR. Equation (18) follows from an additional 
application of Slutsky’s Theorem to the ratio, PGR/PLR.  
Proof of Proposition 5: Because asset returns are independent and identically distributed, a 
sequence of investment episodes for any investor is a renewal process. Therefore, by the 
Elementary Renewal Theorem the average number of investment episodes per unit time in a 
single sequence of trades for a type i investor is 1/[i]. Since type i investors hold the fraction 
ini of the stocks, their trades form the fraction ini/[i] of all trades on average, and this weight 
is used to compute the average statistics. In determining ,G this weight is applied to the sum of 
the probabilities that each of the ni  1 other stocks not traded by the given type i investor has a 
paper gain. The probability limit then follows from Slutsky’s Theorem. The same reasoning 
applies to PGR and PLR.   
Proof of Proposition 6: This proof is similar to that for Proposition 5. Here the stocks in group i 
form the fraction ni/[i] of all trades on average, and this weight is used to compute the average 
statistics. In determining ,G this weight is applied to the sum of probabilities that each of the N  
1 stocks not traded has a paper gain when one of the ni stocks is traded. The probability limit 
then follows from Slutsky’s Theorem. The same reasoning applies to PGR and PLR.   
F: Proof of Proposition 7 
To prove this proposition, we use the following lemma. 
Lemma:  The last two conditions (iii) and (iv) in Proposition 7 
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lead to the two relations  
  (0 , ) (0 , )( if (, ) , , ) .if
X X
R R
U r U rU X R dr X UR R R RX X Rdr
G G
           (A38) 
Proof:  For ,X R we have 
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The first inequality holds because marginal utility is decreasing (assumption iii), and the second 
integrand is evaluated at 0+, its smallest argument in the range of the integral. The second 
inequality holds because marginal utility is increasing in R (assumption iv) and each of the refer-
ence levels at which the integrand is evaluated is above R. A similar proof holds when X < R.  
Proof of Proposition 7:  The reference level for the kth sale is Rk  Xk1 since there are no trans-
action costs, the reference level is constant between sales, and the reference level is updated to 
the investment value after a sale. For any given realized stochastic path of X, assume there is a 
realized loss, and denote its reference level as RI = XI1. By assumption, XI < XI1. First, assume 
that the asset is eventually sold at a price above the reference level for this loss. Let J denote the 
first such sale; that is, for some J, XJ > XI1 > XJ1. The total utility realized from the sales I 
through J is  
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The equality is a tautology with the utility from a fictitious sale occurring at time tJ at 
value XI1 both added and subtracted. This lets us split the sales into two parts. The first line 
includes sales for which the gains and losses (though not their utility) net exactly to zero. The 
utility of this part is bounded by applying the lemma 
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(A41) 
This contribution to utility is negative since each element of the first integrand over losses has a 
matching element in the second or third integrand of gains. Note that the integrals in the first sum 
are negative since the lower limits are larger than the upper limits and the integrand is strictly 
positive by assumption (ii). Assumptions (i) through (iv) assure that the marginal utility of each 
loss element is greater than that of the matching gain element. In particular, marginal utility is 
decreasing in G (assumption iii) so evaluating the marginal utilities of gains at 0+ makes them 
smaller than the marginal utilities of losses evaluated at 0. Marginal utility is also decreasing in 
time (assumption i and ii) and increasing in R (assumption iv), and each gain occurs later and has 
a smaller reference level than the corresponding loss.50  
Since the terms in the first line of (A40) are negative, the total utility realized from the 
                                                 
50 The final inequality is strict because condition (i) on  and condition (ii) on the marginal utility are strict.  
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sales I through J is less than the sum of the two terms in the second line 
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The new inequality in the second line holds because of assumptions (iii) and (iv). The final com-
parison shows that holding the stock with reference level XI1 and selling at XJ lead to strictly 
higher utility than that provided by the original plan, which, therefore, cannot be optimal. 
 Now suppose there is no later sale that occurs at a level above XI1. In this case, the 
accumulated utility up through every sale J after I is weakly negative. Precisely, using the same 
reasoning as before, 
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This is true even for an infinite investment horizon with J  . Therefore, holding the stock at a 
reference level of XI1 with no subsequent sales is strictly better than the original plan.   
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